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RE-CONCEPTUALIZING THE RIGHT OF SILENCE AS
AN EFFECTIVE FAIR TRIAL STANDARD
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Abstract As the European Court of Human Rights has come to qualify the
privilege against self-incrimination and the right of silence in recent de-
cisions, this article argues that the Court has failed to provide a convincing
rationale for these rights. It is claimed that within the criminal process the
right of silence should be distinguished from the privilege against self-
incrimination and given enhanced effect in order to uphold the protective and
participatory rights of the defence which come into play when a suspect is
called upon to answer criminal allegations.
I. INTRODUCTION
When the European Court of Human Rights in Funke v France1 gave expression
to the right of anyone charged with a criminal offence to remain silent and not to
contribute to incriminating himself. This was an important symbolic statement
of the importance of the right across European jurisdictions straddling both
common law and civil law traditions. The right had, of course, been entrenched
in a number of international instruments such as the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UNDHR), the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) and the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) and
although there is no explicit reference to the privilege in article 6 of the ECHR,
the Committee of Experts which reported to the Committee of Ministers of the
Council of Europe on the differences between the ICCPR and ECHR in 1970
had considered that prohibition of self-indictment was of the ‘very essence’ of
a fair trial.2 The European Court of Justice had also recognized the right in an
important judgment in 1989.3 But the Funke decision was the ﬁrst occasion
when the Strasbourg court afﬁrmed the signiﬁcance of the right.
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More recently, however, the Strasbourg court would seem to have dimin-
ished its importance by indicating in cases such as Jalloh v Germany4 and
O’Halloran and Francis v United Kingdom5 that the right is not absolute and
that a range of factors can be taken into account in determining whether the
privilege against self-incrimination will apply in a particular case. More worry-
ingly, the Court in Jalloh suggested that competing public interests such as the
urgent need to obtain evidence may even be taken into account in determining
whether certain treatment amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment.
At a time when the Court appears more ready to countenance public interest
arguments to dilute the force of the individual rights in the Convention, it
would seem to be more important than ever to have a clear view of what the
rights are for.
Yet the rationale for the privilege against self-incrimination has always
been difﬁcult to justify precisely. In the United States an increasing number
of commentators have expressed a declining faith in the rationale for the self-
incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment. It has been described variously
as ‘an unsolved riddle of vast proportions, a Gordian knot in the middle of
our Bill of Rights’6 and a doctrine which cannot be ‘squared with any rational
theory’,7 relying for its justiﬁcation on ‘stirring rhetoric that may move the
heart but leaves the intellect unconvinced’, the fundamental values said to
underpin it being striking in their ‘vacuity and circularity’.8 In this article it
will be argued that the rationales used by the European Court are equally
unconvincing. Part of the difﬁculty it will be argued is that there has been a
failure to differentiate clearly enough between the substantive and procedural
dimensions of the right. The case law of the Court has focused more on those
aspects of the right to do with upholding the dignity and will of the individual
accused than on the more procedural aspects of the right which link it to
defence rights when a suspect or accused is called upon to answer criminal
allegations.9 While the substantive dimensions may be subject to proportion-
ate curtailment, the procedural dimensions have at their root a need to enable
the accused to mount an effective defence which cannot be balanced away
against other considerations. It will be claimed that within the criminal process
4 (2007) 44 EHRR 32.
5 Application nos. 15809/02 and 25624/02, 29 June 2007.
6 AR Amar and RB Lettow, ‘Fifth Amendment, First Principles: The Self-Incrimination
Clause’ (1995) 93 Michigan Law Review 857, quoted in R J Allen and M K Mace, ‘The Self-
Incrimination Clause Explained and its Future Predicted’ (2004) 94 Journal of Criminal Law &
Criminology 243, 245.
7 W J Stuntz, ‘Self-Incrimination or Excuse’ (1988) 88 Columbia Law Review 1227, 1228,
quoted in Allen and Mace, ibid. See also D Dolinko, ‘Is There a Rationale for the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination?’ (1986) 33 UCLA Law Review 1063.
8 Allen and Mace (n 6) 244.
9 See also S J Summers, Fair Trials: The European Criminal Procedural Tradition and the
European Court of Human Rights (Hart, Oxford, 2007) 161–2 (arguing that the focus in the
Court’s case law on the autonomy of the accused neglects the importance of the defence role in
the institutional understanding of fairness).
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the right of silence in particular is entitled to be given an enhanced effect
not speciﬁcally for reasons to do with upholding substantive rights such as
the dignity and respect of the individual but in order to uphold the procedural
rights of the defence which come into play when a suspect is called upon to
answer criminal allegations.
The article is in three parts. First, it will trace the recent jurisprudence of the
Court to show how the right has been diluted in recent decisions. Second, it
will examine the rationales put forward by the Court. Third, it will identify the
need to focus upon the procedural dimensions of the right.
II. THE APPROACH OF THE COURT TOWARDS THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION
Although Funke v France did much to signal the importance of the right,
it was not until the later case of Saunders v United Kingdom10 that the Court
gave greater clarity to its precise scope. The Court emphasized, ﬁrst of all, that
the privilege against self-incrimination and the right of silence were generally
recognized international standards which lay at the heart of the notion of a fair
trial procedure. But it was a right that was conﬁned for the purposes of Article
6 of the ECHR to persons charged with criminal proceedings which, of course,
is given an autonomous meaning within the ECHR system. It was also pri-
marily concerned with respecting the will of an accused person to remain
silent and did not extend to the use in criminal proceedings of material ob-
tained from the accused through the use of compulsory powers, but which
has an existence independent of the will of the suspect, such as documents
pursuant to a warrant, breath, blood and urine samples and bodily tissues for
the purpose of DNA testing. At the same time the privilege extended not just
directly to protect suspects from incriminating themselves but also indirectly
to the use of self-incriminating information against them at their trial.
The Court did not ﬁnd it necessary in Saunders to decide whether the right
was absolute or whether infringements may be justiﬁed in particular circum-
stances. In the earlier case of John Murray v United Kingdom11 it had made it
clear that warning suspects that adverse inferences may be drawn against
them at their trial amounted to an indirect form of compulsion which did not
necessarily destroy the very essence of the privilege. But in Saunders the
Court did not accept the government’s argument that the privilege could be
balanced away on some pressing ground of public interest such as the need to
investigate and punish fraud. The fairness requirement of Article 6 meant that
the privilege applied to all types of criminal proceedings without distinction
from the most simple to the most complex. In Heaney and McGuinness v
Ireland12 the Court took the view that compelling persons to account for their
10 (1997) 23 EHRR 313. 11 (1996) 22 EHRR 29.
12 (2001) 33 EHRR 12.
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movements in the interests of averting terrorism under the Offences Against
the State Act did destroy the very essence of the privilege and the security and
public order concerns of the government could not justify a provision which
extinguished this essence.
This approach suggests that when an infringement goes to the ‘essence
of the privilege’ it can never be justiﬁed whatever the countervailing public
interest considerations. But in Jalloh the Court cast doubt on this by suggest-
ing that in determining whether the proceedings as a whole have been fair, the
Court will weigh the public interest in the investigation and punishment of
the offence against the individual interest that the evidence has been gathered
lawfully.13 In this case emetics was forcibly administered to the applicant after
he was seen to swallow a tiny plastic bag or bubble thought to contain drugs
when he was approached by police ofﬁcers. The applicant was a street dealer
who was offering drugs for sale on a comparably small scale and was ﬁnally
given a six-month suspended prison sentence and probation. As a result the
public interest in securing the applicant’s conviction could not justify recourse
to such a grave interference with his physical and mental integrity. But
in applying this balancing test, the Court left open the possibility that the
privilege could be infringed in the public interest, something that seemed to
be precluded in Saunders and Heaney and McGuinness, thus adding some
uncertainty to the scope of the privilege.
Apart from the question of the weight of the public interest in the investi-
gation and punishment of the offence, the Court in Jallohmentioned a number
of other factors to be taken into account in determining whether the right not
to incriminate oneself has been violated: the nature and degree of the com-
pulsion, the existence of relevant safeguards in the procedure and the use to
which any material so obtained is put.14 In John Murray the Court had already
made a distinction between direct and indirect compulsion and indicated that a
certain amount of indirect compulsion was acceptable. In Jalloh there is also
the suggestion that if there are relevant safeguards in the procedure, these may
be enough to offset a ﬁnding that there has been a violation of the privilege.
The Court observed that section 81a of the German Code of Criminal
Procedure provided that bodily intrusions had to be carried out lege artis by a
doctor in a hospital and only if there was no risk of damage to the defendant’s
health. In this case, however, the applicant refused to submit to a prior medical
examination. He could only communicate in broken English which meant that
he was subjected to the procedure without a full examination of his physical
aptitude to withstand it. This, however, raises the question whether the Court
might have been prepared to consider that there was no violation of the
privilege if he had been subjected to a proper medical examination. It is hard
to see how safeguards to protect the applicant’s physical health could affect
13 (2007) 44 EHRR 32. para 117.
14 ibid, para 44.
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the essence of the privilege which the Court has said it is primarily concerned
with respecting the will of the accused. The suggestion that there may be
compensating safeguards which may be enough to offset the privilege also
raises questions about how signiﬁcant the privilege is in the ﬁrst place.
Finally, the Court’s reference to the use to which any material obtained is
put as a factor in determining whether the right against self-incrimination has
been violated suggests that there may be circumstances when the Court may
consider that incriminating material may be used against the accused at trial.
This would seem to contrast with Judge Morenilla’s view in Saunders that the
very fact that the applicant’s compelled statements had been admitted in evi-
dence against him undermined the very essence of his right not to incriminate
himself.15 In Jalloh the Court stated that the drugs obtained following the
administration of the emetics were the decisive evidence in the applicant’s
conviction for drugs-trafﬁcking, thereby suggesting an analogy with the way
in which the Court approaches the testimony of witnesses whom the accused
has had no opportunity of examining.16 It is to be noted that the question here
is not a legal question requiring some judgment to be made about the import-
ance of the privilege against other principles or public interests. It is more a
factual question whether in the light of other evidence in the trial, the self-
incriminating aspect could not be considered signiﬁcant and therefore to have
affected the overall fairness of the trial. Other questions that are raised by this
approach are whether the use of derivative evidence obtained as a result of
the information provided under compulsion can be used against the accused
or whether the use of the incriminating material to impeach the accused’s
evidence or another witness might be acceptable as an alternative to using the
evidence directly against the accused.17
Instead of re-afﬁrming an approach that would justify certain infringements
of the privilege only where they do not go to the ‘essence of the privilege’,
Jalloh seemed to embark on a ‘wholly new approach’ whereby a wide range
of factors may be considered in deciding whether a particular instance of self-
incrimination constitutes a violation.18 This approach was re-afﬁrmed by the
Grand Chamber in O’Halloran and Francis19 which held it could not accept
that any direct compulsion requiring an accused person to make incriminatory
statements automatically violated the privilege against self-incrimination. The
central issue in each of two applications brought in this case was whether
the privilege was violated when the registered keeper of a car was required
15 (1997) 23 EHRR 313, concurring opinion.
16 cf Kostovski v Netherlands (1991) 12 EHRR 434, para 44.
17 See M Boyle, ‘Freedom from Self-Incrimination and the Right of Silence: A Pandora’s
Box?’ in Mahoney et al (eds), Protecting Human Rights: the European Perspective (Carl
Heymanns Verlag, Cologne, 2000) 1021, 1029–30.
18 This was the view of the dissenting judge, Judge Pavlovschi, in O’Halloran and Francis v.
UK (2008) 46 EHRR 21 (Application no 15809/02). See also A Ashworth, Commentary [2007]
Crim LR 897. 19 ibid.
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under United Kingdom road trafﬁc law to furnish the name and address of the
driver of the car when it was caught speeding on camera. The ﬁrst applicant,
O’Halloran, admitted he was the driver on the occasion in question and he had
argued unsuccessfully at his trial that his confession should be excluded be-
cause his privilege against self-incrimination had been violated. The second
applicant, Francis, on the other hand, was convicted for refusing to supply
the information required. Although the Court did not go so far as Jalloh and
indeed earlier UK authority20 which suggested that the privilege could be
balanced away on broad public interest grounds, it followed Jalloh by re-
ferring to the other factors mentioned in that case which could be taken into
account in order to determine whether the privilege was infringed such as the
nature and degree of the compulsion used to obtain the evidence, the existence
of any relevant safeguards in the procedure and the use to which any material
so obtained was put. The Court concluded that having regard to these factors,
the essence of the applicants’ right to remain silent and their privilege against
self-incrimination had not been destroyed.
As regards the nature and degree of the compulsion used to obtain the
evidence, the Court referred to Lord Bingham’s opinion in the Privy Council
case of Brown v Stott21 that all who own or drive motor cars know that they
are subject to a regulatory regime which requires them to disclose certain
information in the interest of public safety. A further aspect of the compulsion
applied in the present case was that the information required was limited
only as to the identity of the driver. As regards the relevant safeguards, the
compulsion was subject to the safeguard that no offence was committed if
the owner could show that he did not know and could not with reasonable
diligence have known who the driver of the vehicle was. As to the use to
which the statements were put, the identity of the driver was only one element
in the offence of speeding and conviction for such an offence did not arise
solely from the information obtained and in the case of Francis who refused
to give the information in the ﬁrst place, this constituted the offence itself.
The difﬁculty with all these factors is that they do not appear to be par-
ticularly cogent as a means of distinguishing the facts from other cases where
the Court has held that there was a violation of the privilege. Although it may
be relevant to distinguish cases where persons voluntarily engage in certain
activities such as driving and it may be justiﬁed to place certain obligations on
them such as the need to obtain and carry a licence, it can hardly be said, as
one of the dissenting judges put it, that all those who own or drive cars are
automatically presumed to have given up unambiguously and unequivocally
the right to remain silent.22 Even if this could be said, it would seem equally
20 See Brown v Stott [2001] 2 WLR 817 (holding that the power to require owners to name
drivers was not a disproportionate response to the general public interest in maintaining public
safety). 21 [2001] 2 WLR 817.
22 See dissenting opinion of Judge Myjer in O’Halloran and Francis.
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to follow that those like Saunders who voluntarily engage in corporate activity
must also be presumed to have given up their right to silence in relation to the
investigation and prosecution of matters associated with these activities-but
this is not what the majority of the Court presumed in Saunders. The point that
all that was being asked of car owners in this case was to provide one simple
fact may be answered on the ground that the disclosure of one simple fact may
be devastating in terms of one’s incrimination in an offence. The fact that
owners were exonerated when they could not with reasonable diligence have
known who the driver of their car was goes more to the principle of nullum
crimen sine culpa than to the principle of self-incrimination. Finally, the fact
that the use made of the incriminating statement was not enough in itself
to convict one of the offence does not make the statement any the less in-
criminating and the fact that one can be prosecuted and sentenced to a con-
siderable ﬁne for reliance on the privilege appeared to the Court in Heaney
and McGuinness to destroy the very essence of the privilege.
III. RATIONALE OF THE PRIVILEGE AND THE RIGHT OF SILENCE
The degree to which limitations may be put upon the exercise of the privilege
would seem to depend on how signiﬁcant the privilege is considered to be. We
have seen that the Court has linked the privilege and the right of silence very
closely to the aims of a fair trial, putting them at the heart of a fair procedure.
This would seem to suggest that the right is primarily a procedural right
attached to the right to a fair trial rather than a substantive right expressing the
principle that individuals generally should not have to account to the State
for their actions or activities. In an earlier case pre-dating Funke, the European
Commission had recognized a general right of silence as the negative counter-
part of the right to freedom of expression enshrined in article 10 of the
ECHR.23 Applying the broader balancing test required under article 10 the
Commission considered that while there were situations when a person could
be compelled to speak when there is a basis in law, a legitimate aim and a
pressing social need for compulsion such as when witnesses are required to
testify, when persons are required to incriminate themselves out of their own
mouth this involves a particular intrusion on individuals which is entitled to a
particular weighting. This broader right of silence is not one that was pursued
in the jurisprudence and the right has been linked instead to the fair trial right
under article 6.
At ﬁrst sight it seems strange to say that the privilege and the right of silence
lie at the heart of a fair procedure as they prescribe negatively what constitutes
an unfair procedure without positively setting out what is a fair procedure.24
23 K v Austria Series A no 255-B, 2 June 1993.
24 S Trechsel, Human Rights and Criminal Proceedings (Oxford University Press, Oxford,
2005) 347–8.
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The reasons why the Court considers the rights to be so important are to be
found in a passage in Saunders which has been restated in a number of sub-
sequent judgments:25
Their rationale lies, inter alia, in the protection of the accused against improper
compulsion by the authorities thereby contributing to the avoidance of mis-
carriages of justice and to the fulﬁlment of the aims of Article 6 . . . The right not
to incriminate oneself, in particular, presupposes that the prosecution in a crimi-
nal case seek to prove their case against the accused without resort to evidence
obtained through methods of coercion or oppression in deﬁance of the will of the
accused. In this sense the right is closely linked to the presumption of innocence
contained in Article 6.2 of the Convention.
The right not to incriminate oneself is primarily concerned, however, with re-
specting the will of an accused person to remain silent.
Although the Court links the rights to a fair procedure suggesting the rights are
fundamentally about procedural fairness, in fact there are two kinds of ra-
tionales mentioned here which are mixed together somewhat: what has been
described as an intrinsic substantive rationale that it is in principle unfair to
require accused persons to do anything that might incriminate themselves and
a non-substantive rationale which claims that the requirement offends other
basic rights and principles associated with a fair trial such as the presumption
of innocence and the need to avoid miscarriages of justice.26
The intrinsic substantive rationale which would seem to be the primary
concern links the rights to the idea of respect for the will of the accused. This
would seem to be an expression of the principle that any positive participation
by the accused in the criminal process must be on a voluntary basis. One of the
difﬁculties here, however, is in determining when participation is voluntary
and when it is not. Arguably, persons facing criminal allegations are placed in
a position where their freedom to choose whether to speak or not is extremely
limited, all the more so when they are being questioned by the police in
custody. More fundamentally, however, a number of commentators27 have
found it difﬁcult to justify why there should be a special right to protect
accused persons from being required to incriminate themselves. Accused
persons are already protected under the ICCPR, the ACHR and the ECHR in
25 (1997) 23 EHRR 313, paras 68–69; Serves v France (1999) 28 EHRR 265, para 46; Quinn v
Ireland (2001) 33 EHRR 264, para 40; Heaney and McGuinness v Ireland (2001) 33 EHRR 12,
para 40; Allan v United Kingdom (2003) 36 EHRR 12; JB v Switzerland Appl 31827/96 (2001),
para 64; Jalloh v Germany (2007) 44 EHRR 32, para 100.
26 This useful distinction has been made by D McGrath, Evidence (Thomson Round Hall,
Dublin, 2005) 623. See also I Dennis, ‘Instrumental Protection, Human Right or Functional
Necessity? Reassessing the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination’ (1995) 54 CLJ 342, 348
(making a distinction between theories concerned with ‘accusatorial process norms’ and theories
concerned with upholding substantive values).
27 See eg RJ Allen, ‘The Simpson Affair, Reform of the Criminal Justice Process and Magic
Bullets’ (1996) 67 University of Colorado Law Review 988, 1021 and Dolinko (n 7).
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an absolute way from being forced to confess by the requirement that they are
not be subjected to torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. In addition
persons are protected in the criminal process, although not in an absolute way,
by a right to privacy and as we have seen arguably under Article 10 by a
general right of silence. So what is it that justiﬁes the additional protection
from being required to incriminate oneself within the criminal process?
According to critics, we have to fall back here on the ‘old woman’s reason’
given by Bentham that it is harsh to subject accused persons to the burden of
self-incrimination or, as the US Supreme Court has put it, to the ‘cruel tri-
lemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt’.28 Of course, in the reality of
modern criminal justice systems, this trilemma is not so painful as is suggested
here. As a general rule defendants are not prosecuted for refusing to answer
questions before trial and at trial are never prosecuted for contempt for failing
to testify. The modern debate in many jurisdictions is instead directed to
whether adverse evidential consequences should attach to silence.29 In telling
lies there is the risk that one might be caught out but this takes us to the nub of
the point made by many critics that the trilemma, if it is a trilemma, is only
faced by guilty persons.30 Martens J made this point forcibly in his dissenting
opinion in Saunders31 when he said that this rationale cannot justify the
immunities under discussion since they presuppose that the suspect is guilty,
‘for an innocent person would not be subjected to such choices nor bring about
his own ruin by answering questions truthfully’. Consequently, innocent sus-
pects are not treated ‘cruelly or unethically, whilst guilty suspects should not
complain that society does not allow them to escape conviction by refusing to
answer questions or otherwise hiding evidence’.
Mike Redmayne has suggested that we should not be too quick to
accept these counter-arguments.32 He argues that the privilege against self-
incrimination is grounded in the idea that in a liberal democracy citizens are
entitled to distance themselves from prosecutions as this is when the State is
at its most powerful. Distinctions based on the guilty and the innocent imply
that there is no value in protecting a guilty person from self-incrimination.
Yet we should recognize the particular harm which is done to personal
integrity when the State requires us to incriminate ourselves in the course
28 Murphy v Waterfront Commission (1964) 378 US 52, 55, per Goldberg J. For a clear
analysis of Bentham’s arguments, see W Twining, Theories of Judicial Evidence: Bentham
and Wigmore (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1983) 84.
29 P Roberts and A Zuckerman, Criminal Evidence (Oxford University Press, Oxford,
2005) 395.
30 R J Allen, ‘The Simpson Affair, Reform of the Criminal Justice Process and Magic Bullets’
(1996) 67 University of Colorado Law Review 989, 1021.
31 (1996) 23 EHRR 313, para 9, n 74.
32 M Redmayne, ‘Rethinking the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination’ (2007) 27 Oxford
Journal of Legal Studies 209, 221.
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of a prosecution.33 Conversely, the argument that the innocent are never
subjected to cruel choices is also over-stated. As Redmayne has pointed out,
imposing a duty to cooperate may sometimes confront innocent persons with
difﬁcult choices as where one may compelled to incriminate others who are
close to us.34 He gives the example of the owner of a car asked to identify the
person driving his car. If he was not driving then it was another person, pre-
sumably a friend. As Redmayne recognizes, however, the same dilemma
confronts witnesses who are compelled to testify against an intimate person.
We ought not lightly to impose requirements on a person to testify against
such a person but ultimately we consider that such arguments are counter-
balanced by the need for the criminal justice system to have access to in-
criminating information. In a similar manner we should place some weight on
the privilege against self-incrimination but it is hard to see why it should
be given the special status of a fair trial right entitling suspects and defendants
to a special immunity from being compelled to provide self-incriminating
information which may be used against them.
Another problem with a rationale based on respecting the will of the ac-
cused is that it is difﬁcult to ﬁnd a clear and coherent dividing line between
what State conduct may be said to respect the will and what does not. In his
dissenting opinion in Saunders, Judge Martens questioned the distinction be-
tween the use of material obtained by legal compulsion such as blood and
urine samples and the use of material obtained in deﬁance of the will.35 In
both cases the will of the suspect is not respected in that he is forced to bring
about his own conviction. The best interpretation of the distinction made by
the Court is to be found by equating the privilege with an immunity from
wilfully participating in one’s own incrimination. This would include the
handing over of documents but would not include submitting to blood tests,
although certain decisions such as Jalloh do not seem to square with this.
There is still a problem, however, in ﬁnding a rationale which views handing
over documents as coming within the privilege but submitting to a blood test
as outside the privilege. In each case there is compulsion in terms of restricting
personal autonomy, in the one case by requiring the accused to act against his
will and in the other by requiring that he submit to interference with his body.
Thus the Supreme Court of Canada has recognized that the principle against
self-incrimination applies to ‘products of the mind and products of the
body’.36
Some jurisdictions have tried to limit the compulsion to condemn oneself
to testimonial rather than real evidence. This may seem an easier line to draw
although it can still lead to ﬁne distinctions such as what to do about lie
33 See also R K Greenawalt, ‘Silence as a Moral and Constitutional Right’ (1981) 23 William
and Mary Law Review 15, 39.
34 Redmayne (n 31) 222. 35 (1996) 23 EHRR 313, para 12.
36 R v B (SA) [2003] 2 SCR 678, para 34.
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detection tests.37 But the difﬁculty remains that one can incriminate oneself
in other ways than condemning oneself out of one’s own mouth, and if the
rationale for the principle is to be found in respecting the will of the suspect,
why should these other forms of self-incrimination be excluded? One reason
that has been given is that there is something inherently worse about the State
invading the ‘sanctum of the mind’ for the purpose of incriminating an indi-
vidual.38 Another point of difference is that real evidence is frequently more
‘objective’ and reliable with the result that it can be of considerable assistance
in a criminal investigation.39 But these would seem to be arguments better
made in the context of considering whether the privilege should be given more
or less force to speciﬁc situations rather than for making hard and fast dis-
tinctions based on what should be included or excluded within the privilege.
Thus although the Supreme Court of Canada has considered that body samples
may come within the privilege, the key question is whether in each case the
search for truth outweighs self-incrimination concerns about the abuse of state
power. In R v B (SA),40 for example, the Court was asked to make DNA
warrant legislation unconstitutional on the ground that a DNA sample was so
intimately tied to one’s person that the legislation effectively required one
to incriminate oneself. The Court considered that DNA evidence was reliable
and important evidence, unlike in the case of compelled statements which may
well be untrue. On the other side, there was to be weighed the extent of
compulsion being exercised, the degree to which the State and the suspect
were in an adversarial position at the time the evidence was gathered, and any
circumstances that might increase the risk of abuse of power including
the degree of invasion required. Although the Court held that the degree of
compulsion was great and the adversarial position high during a criminal
investigation, the safeguards attached to a warrant and the relatively un-
obtrusive way DNA can be obtained lessened the risk of abuse of power to
the point where the balance favoured discovering the truth over the self-
incrimination concern of the accused. This principled approach towards self-
incrimination is reminiscent of the kind of balancing exercise required in
respect of a number of qualiﬁed rights under the Convention such as the right
of privacy under article 8 and the freedom of expression under Article 10 and
in recent decisions in relation to the privilege against self-incrimination, the
European Court would seem to be following this route. But the question
again arises as to whether a special right against self-incrimination has any
37 See Allen and Mace (n 6) above.
38 R v S (R) (1995) 121 DLR (4th) 589, 702-3, per L’Heureux-Dube J. See also P Arenella,
‘Schmerber and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: A Reappraisal’ (1982) 20 American
Criminal Law Review 31.
39 Ferreira v Levin 1996 (1) BCLR 1, 123, para 259, per Sachs J.
40 [2003] 2 SCR 678.
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particular rationale that could not be served by the rights to privacy and silence
that we have seen already exist or may be deduced under the Convention.41
It would seem to be difﬁcult to justify the privilege against self-
incrimination in terms of a self-standing right that should exist independently
of the absolute right not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment and the qualiﬁed rights to privacy and the general right of silence.
If it is difﬁcult to make out a convincing case for such a substantive right on
its own ground, it is equally difﬁcult to make a convincing case for the need
for such a privilege in order to safeguard other principles. In the statement
quoted above the Court links the privilege with the presumption of innocence.
This presumption carries with it an evidentiary obligation on the state to prove
the ingredients of the offence charged against the accused but it has also been
used to express more diffusely the idea that individuals in the criminal process
should be treated as innocent and that intrusive actions should not be taken
against them unless there are good reasons to do so. This can include such
actions as searching and seizing property, stop and search, arrest and ques-
tioning. But it is difﬁcult to link the privilege conceptually with these prin-
ciples.42 Clearly requiring a person to incriminate himself can constitute
evidence for the prosecution’s case but it does nothing to diminish the high
standard of proof required for guilt. Clearly also we should limit the State’s
ability to take action against us in the criminal process without good reason
but the privilege extends beyond these situations entitling individuals to refuse
to cooperate with an investigation even where there is reasonable suspicion
against them. We might try to link the privilege more closely to the pre-
sumption by saying that it expresses the idea that an accused should not have
to contribute in any way to the prosecution case at least until there is a prima
facie case against him.43 In a case brought under article 6(2) of the ECHR, the
European Court held that drawing inferences against an accused before
there was a convincing prima facie case against him was not permissible,
for the effect was then to shift the burden of proof to the defendant.44 But
the problem again here is that the privilege purports to extend to protecting
persons from direct compulsion to incriminate themselves even when there
is prima facie or strong evidence against them.
Another argument that the Court makes which is closely tied to the pre-
sumption of innocence is that the privilege can help avoid miscarriages of
justice. An obvious ﬁrst problem with this claim is that there is not an exact
ﬁt between protection from self-incrimination and protection from wrongful
conviction. Much argument has been generated over claims about whether
innocent suspects or defendants need the right. Bentham claimed that the right
41 For arguments basing the privilege against self-incrimination on the protection of privacy,
see D J Galligan, ‘The Right to Silence Reconsidered’ (1988) CLP 69.
42 Roberts and Zuckerman (n 28) 414–6. 43 cf RK Greenawalt (n 32).
44 Telfner v Austria (2002) 34 EHRR 207.
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can never be useful to the innocent.45 Bentham was primarily concerned about
bars to questioning witnesses in court rather than with the private interrogation
of suspects in custody which had not been developed in his day and even he
may have conceded that there is a danger of vulnerable innocent suspects
making incriminating statements in the coercive atmosphere of the police
station.46 But according to the European Court, the privilege extends beyond
giving immunity to making incriminatory statements to the handing over of
documents that were in existence before any criminal charge. Clearly these
may be of considerable assistance to the court in determining guilt without any
risk of them being used to convict the innocent.
When the argument is conﬁned to the making of incriminating statements in
the criminal process, another problem is that as an instrumentalist rationale it
risks, more than arguments based on intrinsic merit, counter-arguments being
made that far from providing a protection to the innocent, the right jeopardises
the conviction of the guilty. In the absence of empirical data either way, the
arguments and counter-arguments tend to consist of grossly inﬂated claims
about the effect of the right of silence on the guilty and the innocent without
enough attention being given to the procedural context in which the right
operates. Taking their cue from Bentham, many critics for example, point to
the debilitating effect on the prosecution of allowing the guilty to remain silent
when they erect a ‘wall of silence’ upon being called to account for their
actions. Even when it appears that suspects are hiding behind a ‘wall of
silence’, however, there is little evidence to suggest that removal of the right
of silence will make much difference to the prosecution’s prospects of suc-
cess. When legislation was introduced in Northern Ireland to permit the courts
to draw adverse inferences from silence in certain circumstances, there is
some evidence to suggest that this encouraged more to speak to the police and
testify but no evidence that this did anything to improve the conviction rates.47
Conversely, however, when advocates of the right of silence point to the role
that it plays in protecting the innocent, it is almost impossible to provide data
on the numbers of innocent persons who might be convicted in the absence
of the privilege.48
A sophisticated version of an argument which concedes that the right
encourages the guilty to be silent but claims that abolition would risk the
conviction of the innocent has been put forward by Seidmann and Stein.49
45 Even in his own day, these claims were hotly contested, see eg Lord Denman’s arguments in
the Edinburgh Review in 1824, recounted by Twining (n 27) 105.
46 ibid, 209 n 83. For discussion of how Bentham’s views have been mis-used by modern
advocates of the abrogation of the right of silence in the police station, see W Twining, ‘The Way
of the Bafﬂed Medic’ (1973) 12 JSPTL (NS) 348.
47 See J Jackson, M Wolfe and K Quinn, Legislating Against Silence: The Northern Ireland
Experience (Northern Ireland Ofﬁce, Belfast, 2000).
48 Greenawalt (n 32) 44.
49 D J Seidmann and A Stein, ‘The Right to Silence Helps the Innocent: A Game-Theoretic
Analysis of the Fifth Amendment Privilege’ (2000) 114 Harvard Law Review 431.
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Brieﬂy, the argument is that abolition would encourage the guilty as well as
the innocent to speak with the net result that fact ﬁnders would ﬁnd it harder to
distinguish the guilty who would tell lies from the innocent who would speak
the truth. Consequently, the guilty would pool with the innocent resulting in
the fact-ﬁnder discounting the exculpatory statements of the guilty and the
innocent. Although ingenious, this argument also risks making assumptions
that may not be empirically justiﬁed. In common with other arguments it tends
to make an indiscriminate distinction between two categories of persons—the
innocent and the guilty—whereas in fact a number of persons innocent of
serious charges may be guilty of other offences or have good reason for hiding
things from the police.50 A fundamental problem with the argument, however,
as with all the claims that tend to be made about the right of silence protecting
the innocent is that it tends to exaggerate its signiﬁcance in affecting behav-
iour. It is true that Seidmann and Stein were able to point to the fact that in
the context of the changes permitting inferences to be drawn from silence in
England and Wales, these had encouraged more suspects to make statements
to the police but again in order to show that this has had a detrimental effect on
innocent suspects, there would also need to be evidence to show that this has
affected the way fact-ﬁnders regard exculpatory statements.51 The reality in
most jurisdictions as we have seen is that most suspects and defendants do
speak to the police or testify, irrespective of whether there is a right of silence
or not. Within the context of custodial interrogation, the pressure to speak
notwithstanding the right is immense because silence can be seen as an act of
non-cooperation with the authorities which can do the suspect little good in
terms of decisions that affect his or her liberty or that affect the level of the
charge brought. Certainly where policing is organized around interrogation
and confession, the failure to speak can be interpreted as a challenge to
authority.52 As regards silence at trial, there is the risk that whatever com-
ments are made exhorting juries to disregard the accused’s failure to testify,
juries may penalize defendants for not testifying. If the right of silence does
not affect behaviour that much, then it is hard to see it as a great buttress for
the innocent. Whatever form the argument for the right of silence takes as a
safeguard for the innocent, then, either that it encourages innocent persons to
be silent (and thereby saves them from falsely incriminating themselves) or
50 For other objections to the theory based on the fact that it makes assumptions about the way
suspects and defendants and fact-ﬁnders would act that may not be empirically justiﬁed: see
G Van Kessel, ‘Quieting the Guilty and Acquitting the Innocent: A Close Look at a New Twist on
the Right of Silence’ (2002) 35 Indiana Law Review 924, 956–960 and R Park and MJ Saks,
‘Evidence Scholarship Reconsidered: Results of the Interdisciplinary Turn’ (2006) 47 Boston
College Law Review 1, 72.
51 See T Bucke, R Street and D Brown, The Right of Silence: The Impact of the Criminal
Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (Home Ofﬁce, London, 2000) Home Ofﬁce Research Study
no 199.
52 See D Dixon, ‘Politics, Research and Symbolism in Criminal Justice: The Right of Silence
and the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984’ (1991) 20 Anglo-American Law Review 27, 38.
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that it encourages the guilty to be silent (and thereby marks them out from
being pooled with the innocent), in reality it appears to affect very few people
in their decision whether to speak or not.
Another problem with basing arguments for the privilege against self-
incrimination and the right of silence upon the protection of the innocent is
that again as an instrumentalist rationale they are vulnerable to counter-
arguments that offer compensating mechanisms in exchange for these
immunities.53 The European Court in Murray endorsed such arguments by
permitting adverse inferences to be drawn from silence in certain circum-
stances. Although the Court conceded that warning suspects about inferences
may amount to indirect compulsion, it was prepared to justify this degree of
compulsion provided safeguards are built into the system such as providing
access to legal advice and at court ensuring that any inferences that are drawn
can be justiﬁed. These were exactly the arguments that were used to justify the
extension of the Northern Ireland legislation permitting inferences to be drawn
from silence to England and Wales in 1994. A Royal Commission on Criminal
Justice established to address concerns that had been raised by a number of
miscarriages of justice concluded by a majority that little would be gained and
much might be lost if the right were to go as ‘the possibility of an increase in
the convictions of the guilty is outweighed by the risk that the extra pressure
on suspects to talk in the police station and the adverse inferences invited if
they do not may result in more convictions of the innocent.’54 The difﬁculty
with this approach was that it lent itself open for others to conclude, as the
minority argued, that if enough other safeguards were put in place in the police
station to protect the innocent suspect, then there would be little need for the
right. As the government had already concluded that the balance in the police
station had swung too far in favour of the suspect principally as a result of a
statutory right of access to legal advice introduced in earlier legislation,55
it was able to reject the Commission’s majority view and adopt the minority
view and press ahead with the changes already enacted in Northern Ireland.
IV. THE RIGHT OF SILENCE AS A NECESSARY CONDITION FOR EFFECTIVE
DEFENCE PARTICIPATION
We have reached the point where it would seem difﬁcult to argue for a dis-
tinctive privilege against self-incrimination linked to the right to a fair trial
over and above the other protections provided for by human rights instru-
ments. It is hard to see why we should give speciﬁc priority to respecting the
voluntariness of an accused’s decision to hand over or reveal incriminating
53 See S Greer, ‘The Right to Silence: A Review of the Current Debate’ (1990) 53 MLR 58.
54 Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, Report (1993) Cm 2263, 54.
55 As far back as 1987 it had established a working group to consider how, not whether, the law
should be changed. See Report of the Working Group on the Right of Silence (Home Ofﬁce,
London, 1989).
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information over and above respecting an individual’s general personal
autonomy and freedom of action. Other rationales linked conceptually or
instrumentally to principles and objectives associated with a fair trial fail to
mark out a close enough connection to these principles and objectives.
This is not to say that there should not be a general right of silence deduced
from the right to freedom of expression or linked with other rights such as
the right of privacy by the need to prevent undue government restrictions on
our personal autonomy. We may also want to give special protection against
interferences which compel us to incriminate ourselves and others in the
course of a criminal prosecution. But these rights need to be weighed against
other interests, in particular the need for citizens to account for their actions in
certain circumstances. It has been argued, for example, that it is perfectly
legitimate to require people who engage in regulatory activities to account for
themselves either to public ofﬁcials or to opponents in litigation.56 Within
the criminal justice process there may also be a legitimate aim in requiring
persons to account for themselves in order to reach a conclusion as to whether
a criminal offence has been committed. Applying a strict proportionality test
we should only require persons to account for themselves when certain pro-
portionality conditions are fulﬁlled such as rationality and necessity.57 Just as
the right of silence can be grossly exaggerated as a mechanism for protecting
the innocent, we have seen that it can also be grossly exaggerated as an
obstacle for convicting the guilty. Irrespective of whether there is a right of
silence or not, there are good prudential reasons why suspects and defendants
would want to provide an account of themselves. Of the few who would be
affected by an abrogation of the right and change their behaviour by providing
an account, it is unclear how advantageous their speaking is to the police or
the prosecution.
Hence in general terms we should not require suspects to account for
themselves. Exceptions might be made in cases where it is might otherwise be
difﬁcult to ﬁnd the necessary evidence such as in road trafﬁc cases of the
kind that arose in O’Halloran and Francis where the owner of a car was
required to name who had been driving his car at a particular time when it
was seen to be exceeding the speed limit.58 But it is not enough in these
56 S Sedley, ‘Wringing out the Fault: Self-Incrimination in the 21st Century’ (2002) 52
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 107.
57 See eg R Alexy, ‘The Structure of Constitutional Rights Norms’ in A Theory of
Constitutional Rights (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002) arguing that constitutional rights
are optimization requirements that ought to be realized until competing considerations can justify
their limitation according to strict proportionality conditions.
58 Redmayne (n 31) 230. cf Brown v Stott [2001] 2 WLR 817 where the Privy Council held that
an admission compulsorily obtained under road trafﬁc legislation by the defendant that she had
been driving her car did not violate her right to a fair trial. The Privy Council held that limited
qualiﬁcation of the right against self-incrimination was acceptable if it was reasonably directed
towards a clear and proper objective and represented no greater qualiﬁcation than was called for
by the situation.
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situations, arguably, just to claim that the right of silence can be ‘balanced
away’ by a general public interest such as the need to subject more vehicles
and their owners to a strict regulatory regime.59 There would in addition have
to be speciﬁc reason to show why requiring motor owners to name drivers
was necessary in order to achieve this aim. On this reasoning, pace the ruling
in the Saunders case, there may also be circumstances where enforced answers
made outside the criminal context should be allowed to be presented as part of
the prosecution case. But again these would need to be strictly justiﬁed on
the bases of rationality and necessity, taking account of all reasonable alterna-
tives.60
Short of compelling a person to give evidence or answer questions in the
criminal process, however, once there is a basis in evidence for suspecting that
a person has been engaged in criminal conduct, it would seem reasonable to
call for an answer not out of necessity in order for the prosecution to make out
its case (the need for the prosecution to obtain answers from a suspect can
as we have seen be greatly exaggerated) but rather to advance the general
interests of truth ﬁnding within what may be called the ‘adversarial’ rationalist
tradition.61 Although traditionally this mode of fact-ﬁnding has been reserved
for the trial, states are increasingly ‘front-loading’ the forensic enterprise
into the pre-trial phase in order to expedite proceedings and there is no reason
why this should not be done provided suitable safeguards are put in place.
Safeguards are necessary to ensure that suspects are not put under improper
physical or psychological pressure and that they are able to put forward
any defence as effectively as they can. At the point when there is a basis in
evidence for putting allegations against a suspect, he or she ought arguably to
be given the same or equivalent defence rights as are available at trial which
include, most importantly, access to legal advice, disclosure of the evidence
against him and an authenticated record of any interview either by audio
or video tape. But such safeguards cannot be effective unless they are ac-
companied by a Miranda-style rule prohibiting any questioning until they are
put in place and because as we have seen suspects are inevitably put under
pressure when faced with criminal allegations, especially when they are in
custodial interrogation, suspects in custody should not be able to waive these
rights, at least not until they have had an opportunity to speak to a lawyer.
Once there is sufﬁcient evidence of a person’s involvement in a criminal
offence, the right of silence should arguably be given greater salience than in
59 A Ashworth, Human Rights, Serious Crime and Criminal Procedure (Sweet & Maxwell,
London, 2002) 65, criticizing the Brown decision for putting the privilege against self-
incrimination second to the general public interest.
60 cf Ferreira v Levin 1996 (1) BCLR, 1, para 265, per Sachs J (doubting whether these
conditions were met where examinees’ compelled answers to questions in an inquiry into a
company’s affairs could be used against them in subsequent criminal proceedings).
61 For the claim that most Anglo-American evidence scholarship has been dominated by a
rationalist tradition which gives overriding effect to rectitude of decision making, see W Twining,
Rethinking Evidence (2nd edn, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006) chapter 3.
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other encounters between the State and the citizen by preventing any ques-
tioning until safeguards are put in place to enable the accused to mount an
effective defence. When these are in place, the right of silence would still be
respected in the sense that suspects would not be compelled to answer police
questions but as at trial they would be given the opportunity to respond to
the allegations against them. It is doubtful also whether at this stage there is
any need to apply the ‘indirect compulsion’ of warning suspects that adverse
inferences may be drawn against them. Suspects would be made aware, how-
ever, that they have an opportunity to respond to certain allegations that have
arisen against them and that a record will be made of any answers for the
purposes of trial. In recognition of the growth in non-judicial and non-court
disposals across a number of jurisdictions,62 they would also be made aware
through access to a lawyer of any informal disposals or decisions that may be
made if they are prepared to make an admission to the allegations.
On this analysis the right of silence would be maintained throughout
the stage of police investigation because it is not generally necessary for the
investigation for suspects to be compelled to give evidence. At a point when
there are allegations based on evidence that call for an answer, suspects
should, however, be given an opportunity to respond under conditions that
allow for informed and fair participation. These conditions which would still
caution suspects that they have a right not to respond are required not out of
any sentimental desire to see ‘fair play’ or to give suspects a ‘sporting chance’
to avoid conviction but out of a need to enable suspects to participate effec-
tively in the proceedings that have in effect been mounted against them.
Of course, under legal advice suspects may decide as at trial not to answer
questions. But this decision would be an informed one after they have been
told, for example, that there may be costs attached to such a strategy in terms
of delayed disposal of the case.63 It would also be a decision made with the
62 See S Thaman, ‘Plea-Bargaining, Negotiated Confession and Consensual Resolution of
Criminal Cases’ in K Boele-Woelki and S van Erp (eds), General Reports of the XVII Congress of
the International Academy of Comparative Law (2007). For the effect of recent non-court dis-
posals on suspects in custody such as the use of conditional cautions in England and Wales
whereby defendants who admit their guilt are offered the chance to agree to complying with
certain conditions as an alternative to appearing in court, see J Jackson, ‘Police and Prosecutors
after PACE: The Road from Case Construction to Case Disposal’ in E Cape and R Young (eds),
Regulating Policing The Police and Criminal Evidence Act Past, Resent and Future (Hart,
Oxford, 2008) 255.
63 Although there are limits to the incentives that should be offered to suspects to cooperate,
arguably it is unrealistic for any legal system which with limited resources must try to expedite
proceedings as much as possible not to offer certain incentives to suspects to cooperate with an
investigation. The ICTY Chamber has held that the lack of cooperation of an accused should not
as a rule be taken into consideration as a factor that might justify denial of an application for
provisional release. See Prosecutor v Jokic IT-01-42-PT and IT-01-46-PT, Orders on Motions for
Provisional Release, 20 February 2002. But cooperation with the prosecution can be cited as a
mitigating factor at the sentencing stage: see W Schabas, The UN International Criminal
Tribunals: the Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone (Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge 2006) 532–533.
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full participation of an active defence. The decision not to answer questions
would be a negative one but again as at trial it would be made as part of an
active defence strategy on the basis of equality of arms.
We have reached the point then where it would seem justiﬁed to give the
right of silence a special weighting for suspects in the criminal process and for
this to be considered part of the right to a fair trial. It is not helpful, however,
to link such a right with the privilege against self-incrimination in so far as this
suggests that just because they are suspects they should be given some special
or absolute immunity from disclosing information that may indicate their
guilt. A better ground for justifying a ‘weighted’ right of silence for suspects is
that there needs to be a recognition, especially where suspects are in custodial
interrogation, of the vulnerable position that they are in and of the need
therefore to avoid the risk of false confession.64 When persons such as the
applicant in the Saunders case are required to provide information to non-
criminal investigators, they are often given advanced notice in writing of what
is required of them and positively advised to have a legal adviser present.
A police interview with a person in custody may take a very different form.65
It is certainly arguable that in this situation the potential for systemic abuse of
law enforcement powers is at its greatest.
Our argument for an enhanced right of silence at this stage, however, goes
beyond simply an instrumentalist need to avoid persons falsely incriminating
themselves. As well as providing a protection for the innocent it may be
argued that the right is justiﬁed as a necessary procedural part of the general
rights of the defence to enable the suspect to mount an effective defence.
Commentators are increasingly making a distinction between protective and
participative defence rights.66 The right of silence has tended to be classiﬁed
as a protective right, although on our argument unless it is transformed in the
custodial context into a right not to be questioned akin to the accused’s right
not to be questioned at trial, it is unable to perform an effective protective
function. On our view, however, it ought also to be viewed more positively as
part of the framework for the exercise of effective defence rights. Once under
criminal suspicion, accused persons are entitled to be given the opportunity to
defend themselves but in order to do this effectively, the rights of the defence
need to be put into place before they are asked to provide a defence. Just as
at trial, so in the pre-trial phase, suspects should be given an opportunity to
64 See A Ashworth and M Redmayne, The Criminal Process (3rd edn, Oxford University Press,
Oxford, 2005) 94, P J Schwikkard, ‘The Muddle of Silence’ (2009) 6 International Commentary
on Evidence issue 2.
65 See J Jackson, ‘The Right of Silence: Judicial Responses to Parliamentary Encroachment’
(1993) 57 MLR 270, 274, Dennis (n 26) 370.
66 See, eg A Roberts, ‘Pre-Trial Defence Rights and the Fair Use of Eyewitness Identiﬁcation
Procedures’ (2008) 71 MLR 331, J Jackson, ‘The Effect of Human Rights on Criminal
Evidentiary Processes: Towards Convergence, Divergence or Realignment?’ (2005) 68 MLR 737.
See also Summers (n 9) who makes a distinction between the rights of the accused and the
institutional position of the defence.
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mount their most effective defence and this requires that there should be no
questioning of suspects until such time as the conditions for this are put in
place, principally by giving access to legal advice which is necessary so that
decisions as to how to mount the defence are, just as at trial, taken on an
informed basis. Various options as at trial are available at this stage. One may
simply admit to the allegations that are being put. One may answer police
questions or, depending on the procedure submit to judicial inquiry. Another,
option may be to offer a detailed written explanation of one’s conduct or to
suggest certain lines of exculpatory inquiry.
V. INCORPORATING FAIR TRIAL STANDARDS FROM THE POINT OF BEING CALLED
TO ACCOUNT
Since on our argument then proceedings have effectively begun against sus-
pects as soon as they are to be called to account for evidence against them,
then they should be entitled at that point to all the fair trial safeguards that are
provided under the ECHR and other international standards. This is the point
indeed at which the international criminal tribunals recognise that defence
rights come into play. Article 14 of the ICCPR which includes a right not to
be compelled to give evidence was expressly incorporated into the Statutes of
the ad hoc international tribunals at The Hague and Arusha.67 In addition the
Statutes require that if questioned by the prosecutor, the suspect has a right to
the assistance of legal counsel provided for free if he does not have the means
to pay and the right to any necessary translation.68 The rules go further by
requiring that suspects are informed of these rights before being questioned
and in addition are informed of the right to remain silent, and to be cautioned
that any statement that is made shall be recorded and may be used in evi-
dence.69 Somewhat akin to the Miranda rules,70 the rules further require that
questioning of a suspect should not proceed without the presence of counsel
67 ICTY Statute Art 21, ICTR Statute art 20.
68 See ICTY Statute art 18(3), ICTR Statute art 17 (3). The inclusion of this latter right was
added to the rules in 1995 out of recognition of its importance: see J R W D Jones and S Powles,
International Criminal Practice (3rd edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003) 502.
69 ICTY, ICTR RPE 42A.
70 Note though the difference in that the Miranda rights only extend to a right to the presence
of an attorney prior to questioning whereas the international criminal tribunals extend this right to
the presence of counsel during questioning. This marks an important difference of perception in
the way the right to counsel is exercised. Once a suspect exercises his Miranda rights, it would
seem American defence lawyers virtually always advise suspects not to talk to the police, an
attitude immortalized in Justice Jackson’s comment that ‘[A]ny lawyer worth his salt will tell the
suspect in no uncertain terms to make no statements to the police under any circumstances’:Watts
v Indiana 338 US 49, 59 (1949). See G Van Kessel, ‘European Perspectives on the Accused As a
Source of Testimonial Evidence’ (1998) 100 West Virginia Law Review 837. The way the right is
expressed in the international criminal tribunals’ statutes and rules, however, suggests that de-
fence lawyers have at this stage a more positive role to play in participating in the defence.
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unless the suspect has voluntarily waived his right to counsel.71 In addition
all interviews must be recorded by audio or video-tape.72 The ICTY Trial
Chamber has also recognized the principle that where statements have been
obtained by national authorities in breach of these safeguards, they may not be
able to be admitted.73 The ICC Statute goes further by granting certain basic
safeguards to any persons who are subject to questioning at any time during
an investigation under the Statute including the privilege against self-
incrimination, the right not to be subjected to any form of coercion, duress or
threat, to torture or to any other form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment and rights to translation.74 Then where there are grounds to
believe that a person has committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the court
and that person is about to be questioned either by the Prosecutor or by
national authorities conducting an investigation under the Statute, he shall be
informed of his defence rights which in addition to the rights under the ad hoc
tribunals require that he be informed prior to being questioned of which
crimes he is suspected of.75 Although these rights do not go quite as far as the
optimal rights granted to accused persons at trial, they establish an important
basis for an equality of arms in the pre-trial phase of proceedings at the stage
when accusations are made against suspects.
The European Court has been somewhat unclear as to when defendants are
‘charged’ for the purposes of Article 6 of the ECHR so as to enable their
defence rights to come into play. It has considered that defendants are engaged
within the meaning of article 6 when they have been ofﬁcially notiﬁed of an
allegation or ‘substantially affected’ by the steps taken against them.76 It has
been argued elsewhere that the mere exercise of investigatory powers
against a suspect should not in itself trigger the initiation of proceedings
but that proceedings do commence when defendants are held to account for
allegations.77 If this is the point at which a defendant is charged, his defence
71 ICTY, ICTR RPE 42B. 72 ibid 43.
73 Prosecutor v Delalic´ et al, Decision on Mucic´’s Motion for the Exclusion of Evidence, 2
Sept 1997 (excluding statements obtained by Austrian police in circumstances where the accused
was not offered counsel or informed adequately of his rights). See R May and M Wierda,
International Criminal Evidence (Transnational Publishers, New York, 2002) 277–278.
74 Rome Statute of the ICC, Art 55(1). 75 ibid Art 55(2).
76 Deweer v Belgium (1980) 2 EHRR 439 at [46]; Eckle v Federal Republic of Germany (1983)
5 EHRR 1. The UK courts have been similarly unclear on this point. In Attorney General’s
Reference (No 2 of 2001) the House of Lords held that the point in time at which proceedings
should commence should ordinarily be when the accused is formally charged or served with a
summons. But in R (on the application of R) v Durham Constabulary and Another [2003] 3 All
ER 419, [2005] UKHL 21 the Divisional Court accepted that Art 6 was engaged when a person
had been formally notiﬁed that allegations against him were being investigated. In the House of
Lords Lord Bingham expressed reservations as to whether this was correct but was prepared to
assume with some reluctance that there was a criminal charge against the young person at
the beginning of the process by which he appeared to mean at the point of arrest.
77 J Jackson, ‘The Reasonable Time Requirement: an Independent and Meaningful Right?’
[2005] CLR 3, 19. See Howarth v United Kingdom (2000) 31 EHRR 861, Quinn v Ireland (2001)
33 EHRR 264.
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rights under article 6 are then triggered and he should be entitled to the full
panoply of equality of arms including the presence of a legal adviser when
being questioned and, something that is not presently provided as of right,
disclosure of the case against the defendant as well.78
If the European Court has been less than clear as to when exactly a person is
charged for the purposes triggering Article 6 rights, it has also been less than
unequivocal about the importance of defence rights in the pre-trial phase of
proceedings. In Imbrioscia v Switzerland79 the Court accepted the principle
that a defendant should have a right to assistance by counsel during police
interrogations, although in the instant case it held that there had been no
breach of article 6 because the applicant’s lawyer had not asked to be present.
This makes it clear that it is up to the defence to activate the right to be present
at the examination of the accused.80 Moreover the principle is somewhat
weakened by the fact that the Court considered that there is no breach of
article 6 unless the fairness of the trial is seriously prejudiced by an initial
failure to comply with its provisions. In its own words, ‘the manner in which
article 6 (3)(c) was applied during the preliminary investigation depended on
the special features of the proceedings involved and on the circumstances of
the case.’81 These observations were repeated in John Murray where the Court
recognized the importance of legal advice being made available to suspects
when warned about the possibility of adverse inferences being drawn against
them. According to the Court in this case:82
National laws may attach consequences to the attitude of an accused at the initial
stages of police interrogation which are decisive for the prospects of the defence
in any subsequent criminal proceedings. In such circumstances Article 6 will
normally require that the accused be allowed to beneﬁt from the assistance of a
lawyer already at the initial stages of police interrogation. However, this right,
which is not explicitly set out in the Convention, may be subject to restrictions
for good cause. The question, in each case, is whether the restriction, in the light
of the entirety of the proceedings, has deprived the accused of a fair hearing.
This is a less than ringing endorsement of the right to legal assistance in
the pre-trial phase of criminal proceedings. Three qualiﬁcations appear to be
made. First of all, the Court appeared to link the need for legal advice in-
strumentally with the consequences that may later attach to suspects at their
trial from decisions made at the pre-trial phase. In John Murray the
consequences of the decision not to answer questions were the possibility of
adverse inferences being drawn from this at trial. In the later case of Magee v
United Kingdom83 the applicant was detained and his access to legal advice
78 See eg R J Toney, ‘Disclosure of Evidence and Legal Assistance at Custodial Interrogation:
What does the European Convention on Human Rights Require?’ (2001) 5 International Journal
of Evidence & Proof 39. 79 (1994) 17 EHRR 441.
80 Trechsel (n 24) 267. 81 (1994) 17 EHRR 441, para 38.
82 (1996) 22 EHRR 29, para 63. 83 (2001) 31 EHRR 35.
856 International and Comparative Law Quarterly
was also delayed for 48 hours. He was cautioned under the same legislation
that was used to draw adverse inferences against the applicant in the John
Murray case but unlike Murray, the applicant in this case broke his silence in
his sixth police interview. The prosecution case against him was then based on
the admissions that he made in interview. Having reiterated the principles set
out in Imbrioscia and John Murray the Court considered the conditions in
which the applicant was held in custody and took the view that as a matter of
procedural fairness, he should have been given access to a solicitor at the
initial stages of the interrogations ‘as a counterweight to the intimidating at-
mosphere speciﬁcally devised to sap his will and make him confess to his
interrogators’.84 The caution delivered to him under the legislation was an
element which heightened his vulnerability. The Court concluded that ‘to
deny access to a lawyer for such a long period and in a situation where the
rights of the defence were irretrievably prejudiced was—whatever the justi-
ﬁcation for such denial—incompatible with the rights of the accused under
article 6.’85 While the domestic court found on the facts that the applicant had
not been ill-treated and that the incriminating statements he had made were
voluntary, those that he had made by the end of the ﬁrst 24 hours of his
detention became the central platform of the prosecution’s case and subse-
quently the basis for the applicant’s conviction.
There is little doubt that the consequences of the applicant’s decision to
confess in this case were no less decisive for the outcome of the case than the
consequences of the applicant’s decision to remain silent in the John Murray
case. The need for the applicant to have access to legal advice before
making such a signiﬁcant decision was therefore very strong. But it has been
suggested that the behaviour of the suspect immediately after arrest will
always have consequences.86 If the accused makes a statement then even if this
cannot be later used in evidence, it will be recorded in the continental system
and joined to the ﬁle. In the course of the proceedings it may then be quoted in
order to clarify contradictions between that and later statements. Even under
the US Miranda system statements made in the absence of a lawyer may be
used later to impeach testimony. If the suspect decides to be silent, then it will
be hard especially in the continental system for this to be kept later from the
triers of fact. Under common law systems it may be easier to keep such evi-
dence from the jury but many systems have permitted the prosecution to lead
evidence of how a defendant has reacted to questions and to allow comment
along the lines that a particular defence was ﬁrst put forward at trial.87 More
84 ibid para 43. 85 ibid. 86 Trechsel (n 24) 283.
87 See R v Gilbert (1977) 66 Cr App R 237. In a study conducted for the Royal Commission on
Criminal Justice in 1993 it was found that the jury heard about the defendant’s silence under
questioning in 80 per cent of Crown Court trials. See M Zander and P Henderson, Crown Court
Study (London, HMSO 1993), RCCJ research study no 19. In Canada it seems that efforts are
made to shield the jury from an accused’s pre-trial silence except where it has special relevance,
see DM Paccioco and L Stuesser, The Law of Evidence (4th edn, Irwin, Toronto, 2005) 288–289.
Re-Conceptualizing the Right of Silence 857
broadly, it may be argued that whatever use is made of the suspect’s responses
or lack of them at a later trial, the suspect’s reaction may have a considerable
effect on the way the case is investigated and whether it is prosecuted or
disposed of by other means.
The second qualiﬁcation is that even in circumstances when decisions are
made at the pre-trial stage which have consequences at trial, it would seem
that restrictions may be placed on access to legal advice ‘for good cause’.
Under the Northern Ireland legislation access could be denied to terrorist
suspects for 48 hours if there was a risk of alerting persons suspected of
involvement in the offence who were not yet arrested. In Magee it was con-
sidered that whatever the justiﬁcation, the restriction in this case could not be
compatible with article 6 given the fact that the rights of the defence were so
irretrievably prejudiced. But the Court left it open in other cases to consider
that there may be just cause to restrict access, perhaps where the coercive
atmosphere of the interrogation was less pronounced or where the defendant
was not facing such serious charges.88 The ﬁnal qualiﬁcation made in the
above statement is the familiar resort that we have seen the Court takes to
looking at the proceedings as a whole before deciding whether there has been
a breach of article 6. This has been used in certain cases to uphold the fairness
of trials even where there has a systemic denial of access to a lawyer at the
pre-trial phases. In one case where the applicant had been in custody for
20 days without seeing a lawyer, the Court took note of the fact that at trial
he had the beneﬁt of legal assistance and that he had enjoyed, ‘overall’, a fair
trial.89
In its latest decisions the European Court would seem to have given stronger
expression to the need for suspects to avail of legal advice before being
questioned, although it has repeated the qualiﬁcations made by it in John
Murray. In Salduz v Turkey90 the applicant had been interrogated in the absence
of a lawyer after signing a form reminding him of the charges against him and
of his right to silent. He made various admissions to the police of being in-
volved in an unlawful organization and hanging an illegal banner from a
bridge. He later retracted his statement to the police alleging that it had been
extracted under duress. His statement was used for the purpose of his con-
viction and in concluding that there had been a breach of article 6 the Court
held that he had been undoubtedly affected by the restrictions on his access to
a lawyer. The Court expressly linked the right of access not only to the need to
protect the accused against abusive conduct on the part of the authorities and
88 cf Brennan v United Kingdom (2002) 34 EHRR 18 where the Court considered deferral was
in good faith and on reasonable grounds but in any event the admission was made after the
deferral of access and could not be linked to it.
89 Sarikaya v Turkey, Application no 36115/97, 22 April 2004. See also Mamac¸ v Turkey,
Application nos 29486/95, 29487/95, 29853/96, 20 April 2004. Cf Ocalan v Turkey (2003) 37
EHRR 10. 90 Application no 36391/02, 27 November 2008.
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the prevention of miscarriages of justice but also to fulﬁlment of the aims of
article 6, notably ‘equality of arms between the investigating or prosecuting
authorities and the accused’.91 The Court underlined the importance of the
investigation stage for the preparation of the criminal proceedings as the evi-
dence obtained during this stage determines the framework in which the
offence charged will be considered at the trial. At the same time, the Court
continued, ‘an accused often ﬁnds himself in a particularly vulnerable position
at that stage of the proceedings, the effect of which is ampliﬁed by the fact that
legislation on criminal procedure tends to become increasingly complex, no-
tably with respect to the gathering and use of evidence’.92 As a result in most
cases this particular vulnerability can only be properly compensated for by the
assistance of a lawyer whose task it is, among other things, to help ensure
respect of the right of an accused not to incriminate himself which pre-
supposes that the prosecution in a criminal case seek to prove their case
against the accused without resort to evidence obtained through methods of
coercion or oppression in deﬁance of the will of the accused. Against this
background and against the repeated statements of the European Committee
for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment that the right of a detainee to have access to legal advice is a
fundamental safeguard against ill treatment, the Court found that in order for
the right to a fair trial to remain sufﬁciently ‘practical and effective’ Article 6
(1) required that, as a rule, access to a lawyer should be provided as from the
ﬁrst interrogation of a suspect by the police, unless it is demonstrated that in
the light of the particular circumstances of each case there are compelling
reasons to restrict this right.93 Even then the rights of the defence must not be
unduly prejudiced and the Court went on to say more unequivocally than it did
in Magee that the rights of the defence will in principle be irretrievably pre-
judiced when incriminating statements made during police interrogations
without access to a lawyer are used for a conviction.
This judgment is to be welcomed for putting the right of access of a lawyer
on a ﬁrmer footing emphasising not only the protective role that the lawyer
can play in ensuring that detained persons are not coerced into making a
confession in breach of the privilege against self-incrimination but also the
positive participative role that is required in advising on the complexities of
gathering and using evidence.94 This is emphasised particularly in the concur-
ring opinions of Judge Zagrebelsky with Judges Casadevall and Turmen and
of Judge Bratza who would have preferred the Court to have emphasized that
detained persons should be entitled to access to legal assistance not just from
the point of interrogation but as soon as they are imprisoned so that from that
stage they can give their lawyer instructions in order to prepare their defence.
The Court emphasizes the important impact which the investigation stage
91 ibid para 53. 92 ibid para 54. 93 ibid para 55.
94 Salduz has applied in a number of recent cases see Panovits v Cyprus, Appln. no
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may have for the trial but the reality is that increasing numbers of cases in
many jurisdictions do not reach trial at all. This makes it all the more im-
portant, however, that accused persons are given access to a lawyer before the
ﬁrst stages of interrogation as in many cases it is this ﬁrst encounter with the
police that may determine whether the case is advanced to trial or is otherwise
diverted out of the court process. Another useful aspect of the judgment is that
it emphasises that if defence rights are to be waived, any waiver must be
established in an unequivocal manner and be attended by minimum safeguards
commensurate to its importance.95 Thus in the present case no reliance could
be placed on the assertion in the form that the applicant had been reminded of
his right to silent. It may be argued indeed that to be effective any waiver must
be witnessed by a lawyer or a judicial ﬁgure rather than simply be made in the
presence of the police.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this article we have argued that although human rights standards and jur-
isprudence have linked the privilege against self-incrimination with the right
of silence as an essential ingredient of a fair trial, it would be better in the
context of fair trial rights to make a distinction between the two. While in
general terms these rights may be viewed as part of the need for states to
respect the individual dignity and autonomy of the individual, it is indisput-
able that there are circumstances when they may have to give way to other
considerations when states need access to information. We have argued,
however, that within the criminal process the right of silence is entitled to be
given a special weighting not speciﬁcally for reasons to do with upholding
substantive rights such as the dignity and respect of the individual but in order
to uphold the procedural rights of the defence which it has been argued come
into play not just at the trial phase of criminal proceedings but also at the stage
of pre-trial proceedings when a suspect is called upon to answer allegations
against him.
Human rights jurisprudence has developed special participatory rights for
the defence such as the equality of arms and the right to adversarial procedure
at the trial phase of proceedings. It would seem only logical that these prin-
ciples are also applied at the pre-trial phase when the defendant is equally
affected by the proceedings by being asked to participate in them. If it is
important for a defendant to be given full access to the rights of the defence at
the stage when he or she is asked to account for allegations in order to mount
the most effective defence, then it is important that these rights are in place at
this stage and that a defendant is not called to account for actions until they
are in place. The right of silence should be transformed at this stage of the
criminal process from a right which is linked to the exercise of an individual’s
95 See also Panovits v Turkey, Appln. no 4268/04, 11 December 2008.
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will but is extraordinarily difﬁcult to assert in the coercive atmosphere of a
police station and should become instead a procedural right inextricably
linked to the participatory rights of the defence by requiring that there can be
no participation by the accused until the conditions for fair and informed
participation are put in place. In order to further highlight the distinction
between these two aspects of the right of silence, one predicated upon the
exercise of will and the other linked institutionally with the rights of the
defence, it can be argued that accused persons should not, at least in the most
serious cases, be able to able to waive their defence rights without at least
having consulted with a solicitor. Defence rights exist arguably not just out of
respect for the dignity of the individual but to safeguard institutional values
that are held dear in the criminal process such as the need for accurate ﬁndings
of fact and the protection of the innocent. Once the rights of the defence are
put in place, however, the right of silence reverts to an exercise of will or
choice on the part of the individual accused, but a choice that is made on an
informed basis as part of a defence strategy which is taken in full recognition
of the costs and beneﬁts of its exercise.
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